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The students of the School of Law no
less than those of the College and of the
Does the Law School need a dormitory? Preparatory School, most sincerely and
To one mingling with the students of the profoundly deplore the sudden death on
Law School, the above question comes Sunday morning, January 23rd, of Rev.
Dr.
M. J. Cramer, S. T. D., LL. D.
most frequently: in fact it is a question
his
death,
time
of
at
the
was
Cramer
agitating the minds of not a few of the
present attendants of the Law School. professor of Philosophy in Dickinson ColAmong the many arguments in the affirm- lege, in which clair he had won the appreative of this question are that, (1) dor- ciation of the students by his erudition,
mitories are essential elemlents to a well his skill as a teacher, and his uniform
regulated educational institution. (2) Tile' kindness and courtesy. As was well said
student body would be intact. (3) Col- by Dr. Reed, the president, at the obselege students are obliged to room in dormi- quies, Dr. Cramer was a "great man."
tories and are thus kept under the direct He had for twenty years occupied immanagement of the faculty. Why not Law portant diplomatic posts under the governstudents? (4) Association of student with ment of the United States. He was a
student is conducive to the intellectual many-sided scholar; a profound thinker;
health of all concerned. (5) It would in- an eager student of politics; an able
crease the attendance of our rapidly grow- preacher. As the brother-in-law of Gening and prosperous Law school. (6) Stu- eral U. S. Grant, he had came into contact
dents coming to the school would not be with many of the great men of his own
inconvenienced by being compelled to country, and his European sojourn had
hunt rooms which, as is very often the given him intimaterelations with scientific
case, are unsuitable. (7) The student men, statesmen, and even kings of the old
body would gladly welcome such an ac- world. His decease was very sudden, and
quisition as filling a much needed want. has cast a gloom over all tile institutions
We understand that buildings in close grouped around the college, as well as over
proximity to the Law School are for sale the whole community. AVe most sincerely
condole with the bereaved widow, and
which would be most appropriate for our
the only son, in this terrible affliction.
required dormitories. Will the institution
grant her students this boon and add to
The organization of the Plume and Platits honor and efficiency? Let us hope she
will. Or will some kind benefactor come ter Club is another sign that our school is
abreast with the times. All other schools
forward in this hour of greatest need?

EDITORIAL.
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of any note have their glee club, orchestra,
musical, dramatic and similar organizations. The Plume and Platter Club is a
dramatic organization similar to the Mask
and Whig of the University of Pa., and
Hasty Pudding, of Harvard. From the
character of the work of the organization
last year, the school will have no fear that
the Club will not thoroughly uphold the
reputation of the Law School. Publicity
is now one of the essentials to success in
almost all our business undertakings and
just as business men advertise to this end,
so educational institutions do the same
with the limited means afforded them.
Schools are now famous not alone for their
philosophy but also for the organization
of their students, as foot-ball elevens and
glee clubs. Nothing that we know of attracts young men more to a school than
strong, successful organizations among the
student body. The Law School has its
full representation in the College organizations but their success is the success of the
college. The Plume and Platter Club is
an organization of Law students and will
appear before the public as such. Hence,
being strictly an organization for the
Law School, it Ceserves the united support of the Law students, and it will do
more than its share to bring to the notice
of young men the existence of our school,
and the character of the student body and
the work done there by them.

ALUMNI PERSONALS.

J. Wilmer Fisher, '96, is enjoying a firstclass clientage, especially in the Orphans'
Court, at Reading.
Quite recently there appeared in the
Philadelphia Inquirer pictures of George
Edward Mills, '92, our professor of Torts,
and Lewis S. Sadier, '96, who are spoken
of as nominees for the office of District
Attorney at the Cumberland County Bar.
It is with pleasure we note that Frank
C. Bosler, '96, is a prime mover in the
Sugar Beet Industry. As a result of his
efforts and thorough knowledge of the
subject, he has interested the farmers of
Cumberland and Franklin counties in the
cultivation of sugar beets and contemplates
the organization of a company which may
possibly locate its plant at Carlisle.
We are indebted to Harry F. Kantner,
'97, who is progressing in the office of
Daniel R. Schmick, Prothonotary of Berks
county, for news of some of the boys.
Edmund L. Ryan, '97,
several days in Carlisle.

lately spent

S. A. Soult, '94, is a candidate for Republican nomination for District-Attorney
in Northumberland county.

Thomas K. Leidy, '97, who is practicing
at Reading, is meeting with great success.
His offices are located at No. 40 North 6th
street.

Judge Louis E. McComas, of Hagerstown, Md., recently elected senator tosucceed Arthur P. Gorman, graduated from
Dickinson College, in 1866, and we are
proud to say also, that this distinguished
gentleman is one of the incorporators of
the Law School.

Edwin S. Livingood, ex-'98, is travelling through the Western states for his
health.

LEGALES JOCI.

Harvey S. Kaiser, '97, Doylestown,
spoke on the Reform movement before the
Farmer's Institute at Richborough, on
February 9th.
Paul H. Price, '97, is studying in the
office of Ex-State Senator Edwin H.
Shearer and expects to take the examinations at the Berks County Bar in the fall.

Fonon OF HAIT.-It is said of an Illinois judge who, as an attorney, had been
somewhat noted as an objector, that during his first term on the bench when an
improper question was asked by a lawyer,
he exclaimed, "I object." As the hilarity
in the court room subsided, he said with
great dignity, "That objection is sustained." No one took exception.-Case and
Comment.
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COmtiON LAW DELUGE.-At common
law a ,€widow's quarantine" permitted a
widow to reignforty days and forty nights
in the principal mansion of her husband.
HOW IT AFFECTED Hiii.-Friend-How
do you feel when your wheel throws you
down?
Lawyer-(who is learning to ride). Like
suing some one for damages.-Puck.
HOLDING IT UNDER ADVISEMENT.-A

Missouri justice of the peace at the close of
a case announced with great dignity: "I
will hold this case under advisement until
next Monday morning, at which time I
will render judgment for the plaintiff."-Case and Comment.
Too MUCH OF A JoKE.-Judge-Now
Sam, tell me why you stole those shoes?
Sam-Oh yer honor, I jes took 'em for
a joke.
Judge-(not without wit). Took them
for a joke did you, well how far did you
take them?
Sam -About a mile, yer honor.
Judge-Well Sam, that's carrying the
joke a little too far,-sixty days.

THE SCHOOL.
Miss Julia Radle, accompanied the Junior College Quartette as elocutionist, on
their recent trip to Dilsburg.
Many of the students have been attending the sessions of Courts of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas during the last
two weeks. Some of the cases were of a
very interesting character and much was
learned by the students in regard to
methods of procedure in the trial of the
various cases that come before the court.
The Middle Class having completed the
study of Agency, has taken up the subject
of Damages.
Robert W. Irving, Esq., '97 post-graduate, was assigned by Judge Biddle to defend the two Indian girls charged at the
recent term of court with attempting to
burn the Girls' Building of the Indian
School. His eloquent plea for the girls,
who plead guilty of the charge, elicited

words of praise from many who were present.
Jno. G. Miller, '99, who has been confined to his home at Pine Grove Mills,
Pa., for the past two months with an attack of typhoid fever, has recovered and
resumed his studies in the school.
A. J. Feight, post-graduate '97, has been
elected Councilman on the Republican
ticket in New Cumberland. He was supported by Democratic voters.
The following members of the Senior
Clas- have been appointed a committee to
make all arrangements for the coming
commencement to be held June 6: Chas.
E. Daniels, Chairman; Sylvester B. Sadler,
Win. K. Shissler, Miles H. Murr and
Francis Lafferty.
Among the Law students who attended
the February reception at Wilson College
were A. M. Duvall, Clarence R. Gilliland,
G. Fred Vowinkle, Alfred J. Feight, Merkel Landis and Cleon N. Berntheizel.
Several of the students attended the
lecture by Dr. Gilbert, of Huntingdon, in
Bosler Hall, Tuesday, Feb. 8, on the subject: "The Origin of Man, or, A Study in
Anthropology." Dr. Gilbert, who is a most
forceful and interesting speaker, held the
close attention of the audience during the
entire ninety minutes consumed in the delivery of his address.
Samuel B. Hare, '98, Arthur M. Duvall,
'98, Hugh Miller, post-graduate, '97, W.
Lloyd Snyder, '98, Chas. R. Weeks, '99,
took part in the rendition of the oratorio,
"The Daughter of Jairus," given by the
Dickinson Musical Association in Bosler
Hall, Friday evening, Feb. 11th.
Among the many men of genius in the
class of '98, Jackson 0. Haas stands at the
head as an inventor. For six years preceding his course at the Law School he
was pursuing that line of work at Baldwin Locomotive Works, where he has left
many traces of his mechanical genius. His
more important inventions include an improved self-binder adapted to the use of
straw rather than twine, a square hole
augur, an improved lathe, a tool holder, a
ball bearing centre and many others. Now
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he is learning to invent defences where
none exist.
W. B. Freed, '99, and G. H. Moyer, '98,
visited their homes during the past week.
P. E. Radle, '98, and A. Frank John,
'99, delivered addresses Tuesday evening,
Feb. 15th, before a meeting of the Sons of
Veterans held in Harrisburg.
THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
On the second meeting night of the present term, Chester C. Bashore, Esq., of the
Cumberland County Bar, an almunus of
the Law School and at present a candidate for the Republican nomination for
District-Attorney, sat as judge in an interesting case before the Allison Society.
The plaintiff was represented by Messrs.
Freed and Wood; the defense by Messrs.
Reese and Haas. The argument was able
and thorough, the question at issue being
one involving certain rights of executors.
Mr. Bashore, in a clear opinion, decided
in favor of the plaintiff.
".solved, That the Policy of the Government Should be Retrenchment in the
Matter of the Pension System," was the
subject of the lively and hard fought debate in the society on Wednesday evening,
February 2nd. The affirmative was upheld by Messrs. Weeks and Sypherd; the
negative by Messrs. Wood and Stephens.
The arguments were ably compiled, and
were adduced with much clearness and
force. The judges were Messrs. Thomas
B. Pepper, A. T. Morgan and R. P. Stewart, of the Dickinson Society. Two decided in favor of the affirmative and one
for the negative.
Hon. W. F. Sadler, ex-Judge of Cumberland county, and a member of the Law
School faculty, lectured before the Allison
Society, Wednesday evening, February
9th, the Dickinson Society joining with
the former. President Pepper, of the
Dickinson Society, presided. Judge.Ssdler's prominence not only in Cumberland
county, but at many other Bars as well,
and his recognized ability and learning in
law caused the students to treasure highly
the very valuable instruction given in a
lecture on "Banks and Clearing Houses."

The Judge began with a history of the
Bank of England and then proceeded with
a statement of the purposes and progress
of banking institutions in the United
States. The final part of the lecture was
devoted to a discussion of clearing houses.
The lecture was exceedingly interesting
and in fields of instruction where the students have not gone to any great extent.
It will be remembered with much profit.
On motion of W. A. Jordan, a very
hearty vote of thanks was tendered Judge
Sadler.
DICKINSON SOCIETY.
The Dickinson Society continues to
prosper. Three new members, l. D. Davis
of Mt. Carmel, Pa., Eli Saulsbury of
Georgetown, Del., and Geo. B. Betson of
Baltimore having been added to the roll.
On Friday evening, Jan. 21, Prof. A. G.
Miller spoke before the society on "The
Duties and Functions of a Grand Jury in
Pennsylvania."
The lecture was brim
full of interesting facts, presented in a
very able manner, which was attested to
by the applause which greeted the speaker
at the close of his address and by the
unanimous vote of thanks which was tendered him by his audience.
Professor
Miller is the head of the Department of
Blackstone in the school, and in addition
to this enjoys a lucrative practice before
the bar of Cumberland county and is also
engaged in several successful manufacturing enterprises.
On Friday evening, January 28th, Jno.
R. Miller, Esq., the genial secretary of the
Examining Board of the Cumberland
County Bar, sat as judge in the trial of a
case which was argued by Lane & Scheeline for the plaintiff and Henry & Roth
for the defendant. In addition to being
a good fellow, justly popular among the
boys, Mr. Miller is a lawyer of no small
ability as is evinced by his large and successful practice.
On Friday evening, February 4th, the
society was treated to one of Prof. H. Silas
Stuart's usually excellent addresses, the
subject being "Liens."
The speaker presented his subject in such a manner as
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only one who is well versed in this difficult branch of the law can, and was listened to with the closest attention by
every one present. At the close of his address Prof. Stuart was extended a vote of
thanks, and requested to favor us with his
presence in the near future, and deliver
his lecture on "Justinian and his Principles," to which he consented, when we
are sure a still larger audience will greet
him.

At the meeting of February 11, President
Pepper, after serving the usual term of six
weeks retired, and Mr. J. Austin Sullivan,
of Altoona, was unanimously elected to
succeed him. President Pepper characterized his administration Jby unusual activity in behalf of the best interests of the
society, in which he was ably assisted by
Mr. Duffy, chairman of the executive
committee. Let us hope that the new
president will carry out the policy of progress outlined in his inaugural address so
that when the time comes for him to lay
down the gavel for the last time, the society may be the better for his having
served as its president.

THE MOOT COURT.
IRS. SMITH vs. JOHN RAY.
Specific performance- Reimbursement
of aqents- Usury-ewulting trust.
Bill in equity, praying a decree for a
conveyance.
GARRETT STEVENS and CHAS. E. DANIELS for the plaintiff.

1. A resulting trust arises in favor of
the plaintifi.-Am. & Eng. Encyc. Vol.
10, p. 8; Appeal of Cross and Gault, 97 Pa.
471; Crawford v. Thompson, 142 Pa. 551.
Salsbury v. Black, 119 Pa. 200; Hoover v.
Hoover, 129 Pa. 201; Earnest's Appeal,
106 Pa. 310; Nixon's Appeal, 63 Pa. 279;
Bickel's Appeal, 86 Pa. 204; Fahnestock's
Appeal, 104 Pa. 46.
2. Ray is entitled only to $2,172 with
legal interest.---Act of April 10, 1879. 1
Vol. Brightly's Purdon's Dig. 272; Wolbach v. Lehigh Build. Ass'n, 84 Pa. 211;
Tanner's Appeal, 95 Pa. 118. He was not
her agent.
3. Defendant's claim is usurious.-Act
of May 28, 1858, 1 Vol. Brightly's Purdon's,
1062; 1 Vol. Forum 12; Bosler v. Rheem,
72 Pa. 54; P. & S. R. R. v. Lewis, 33 Pa.
33; Hartman v. Danner, 74 Pa. 36; Evans
v. Negley, 13 S. & R. 218; Vantine v.
Wood, 13 Pa. 270.

MISS JULIA A. RADLE and J. AUSTIN
SULLIVAN for the defendant.
1. Defendant acted as ao-ent.-Valentine v. Parker, 5 Pa. 333; %trimpfler v.
Roberts 18 Pa. 283; Goss v. Helbring, 77
Cal. 190; Churchhill v. Palmer, 115 Mass.
310; The Odorilla v. Baizley, 128 Pa. 283;
2 Kent. 614. Note; Mundorff v. Wickersham, 63 Pa. 87; Wright v. Burbank, 64
Pa. 247; Kramer v. Dinsmore, et. al., 152
Pa. 264; Clark on Contracts, 720.
2. An agent is to be reimbursed for all
sums which he has paid out, in the due
course of the agency.-Mfaitland v. Martin, 86 Pa. 120. And may recover interest from the time of payment.-Delaware
Ins. Co. v. Delaunie, 3 Binn. 294; White
v. Nat. Bank, 102 U. S. 658; Elliot v.
Walker, 1 Rawle 126; Trotter v. Grant, 2
Wend. 413; Crase v. Cockle, 76 Ill. 484.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Prior to December 1, 1890, James Kellogg contracts to sell a lot of land to
Sarah Smith for $1,000. Having paid
$900 of the purchase money, Mrs. Smith
makes a written contract with John Ray,
to build on the lot a two-story frame house,
for $2,000, payable at the completion of the
work, viz, on May 1, 1891. As Ray objects to building the house on land to
which Mrs. Smith has not the legal title
it is agreed, at the same time, that Ray
shall pay the balance of the purchase
money with interest, $172, to Kellogg, and
receive a deed. On May 1, 1891, when the
house is finished Mrs. Smith is unable to
pay for it. It is therefore verbally agreed
between her and Ray, that the latter shall
borrow $2,172 from a building association,
and give the association a mortgage on the
premises. The mortgage is accordingly
made, in the name of Ray, conditioned
for the payment of $40 monthly until the
maturity of the stock. To the negotiations
between Ray and the association Mrs.
Smith is not a party. On Nov. 1, 1897,
Ray has fully performed his contract with
the association, having paid to it, altogether $2,700, and at his instance, the
mortgage is satisfied. On May 11, 1891,
Ray procures from Mrs. Smith a sealed
undertaking on her part to pay the money
to the association, according to the terms
of the mortgage; he engaging to convey
the land to her, as soon as the association
is paid. Ten days after this, Mrs. Smith
informs Ray of her inability to pay so
much, and he verbally agrees that she
shall pay monthly what she can. She ac-
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cordingly makes monthly payments down
to November, 1897, not however, to the
association, but to Ray, and seldom of so
much as$40. About the 11th of May,
1891, Ray executes a lease to Mrs. Smith,
stipulating for the payment of $40 per
month. This lease Mrs. Smith signs as
lessee. Mrs. Smith having paid $1,200 to
Mr. Ray, and offering to pay what remains of the principal debt of .$2,172, and
interest thereon, at the rate of 6 per cent.
files this bill in equity to compel Ray to
receive the amount she tenders, and make
a conveyance to her of the land. Ray declines to make sucl'i conveyance until all
that he has paid the Association, $2,700,
shall be repaid him.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

On this demurrer, the only question is,
whether Mrs. Smith is, on the facts averred, entitled to a conveyance.
Mrs. Smith, by the contract with Kellogg, acquired an equitable estate in the lot.
She could compel a conveyance of it, by
tendering the purchase money. Morgan
v. Scott, 26 Pa. 51. Kellogg could it is
true, convey the land to a third person,
but such person would take it, subject to
precisely the same trust, if he knew of
the contract. Magee v. Magee, 1 Pa. St.
405. As Ray knew of the contract with
Kellogg, he acquired the land subject to
the same duty to convey it, on the payment of the purchase money. Has then
the purchase money been paid?
Mrs. Smith not only induced Ray to
buy the land from Kellogg, but to erect a
house on it for $2,000. When the time for
payment arrived, she was unable to make
it. She in substance agrees that Ray shall
borrow the money, and charge the land
for its repayment. She also binds herself
personally by the agreement of May 11,
1891, as she had orally a few days before,
to Ray, to pay the association, and so discharge his bond to it. The money is thus
obtained by Ray. i. e. not only the $2,000
contract money, but the $172 residue of
the purchase money. We think that co.
instanti, she became entitled to a conveyance. She would have taken the land, it
is true, subject to the mortgage to the association. If, she neglecting to pay the
association, Ray had paid it, as ie in fact
has paid it, he would have had a right to

an assignment of it, or to subrogation to
it, and, although he has satisfied it of
record, it is not too late for him to obtain
subrogation. It would be inequitable to
compel him to convey the land to Mrs.
Smith without permitting him to revive
the mortgage. For how much then, must
the mortgage be revived?
Had 'Mrs. Smith borrowed the money
directly from Ray, or had she simply continued on the footing of her original contractual indebtedness to him, it is entirely plain that all she would have been
obliged to pay him would be $2,172 with
interest at the rate of 6 per cent. But as
he insists on immediate payment, she
authorizes him to borrow the money from
a building association, on the terms on
which such associations usually lend
moneys, andpromises to repay the association, in discharge of his liability upon
his bond. Can she, after he has borrowed
the money from the association, in exact
accordance with the agreement, has entered into a bond and has discharged the
bond, refuse to pay him any portion of the
suni thus paid by him, because, had she
been a borrower from him, she would have
been compelled only to pay a less sum?
When Ray borrowed from the building association, he acted for her as her agent.
Whatever interest she knew he would have
to pay, he can recover from her. In Stevens
v. Davis, 3 Metc. (Mass.) 211, it is said
that if the creditor, when his debt becomes
due, is induced by the debtor to borrow an
equivalent sum, from a third person, so as
to enable him to give more time to the
debtor, on the debtor's promise to repay a
bonus that the creditor would have to pay
the lender, such bonus is not usury. Cf.
Kimball v. Boston Athenaeum, 3 Gray
225; "Where a debtor, being unable to
raise the money, with which to pay his
creditor, directed the latter to raise it elsewhere, promising to pay him whatever
rate of interest lie might be obliged to pay,
and thereupon the creditor borrowed the
money at usurious rates, it was held that
lie was acting merely as the agent of his
debtor, and could recover of him the full
amount of interest paid."
Shirley v.
Spencer, 9 Ill. 583; 27 Am. & Eng. Encyc.
1051.
It is suggested that Mrs. Smith could
not have made herself liable to the Build-
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iug Association for interest at a greater
rate than 6 per cent., and consequently,
that she could not make herself liable to
Ray who did obtain the money from the
association. One case just cited, negatives this position. It was lawful for Ray
to contract to pay to the association the
interest he paid, and he entered into this
contract at the instance, and for the benefit of Mrs. Smith. He did not wish to
sue her, and sell the lot with the house he
had just erected on it, and for which he
may have had a mechanic's lien. Both
she and he supposed that she could pay off
the debt gradually in the manner in which
associations require debts to be paid.
Whether it was wise for lrs. Smith to
enter into the arrangement, the loan was
in fact procured at her request. Besides,
it does not appear how Mrs. Smith was
precluded from borrowing from the associauon. The suggestion that she was a
married woman is not supported by the
evidence. The title Mrs. is not decisive.
If she was a married woman, she had authority under the Act of April 10, 1879, 1
P. &. L. 464, to join the association, to
borrow money and bid premiums therefor,
and to execute a bond and mortgage.
While the husband must join in such bond
and mortgage, there is no suggestion that
if husband there was, lie would have refused to unite with Mrs. Smith in such
bond and mortgage.
We see nothing in the lease or in the
supposed parol understanding with Mrs.
Smith, that she might pay such smaller
monthly sums than $40, as she should be
able, to exonerate her from the duty of
reimbursing Mr. Ray for all the money he
paid to the association.
It seems a hardship that a needy borrower must pay such a high rate of interest. But building associations have received the sanction of universal use in the
Anglo-Saxon world. In England, in all
her colonies, in every American State, so
far as we know, they flourish. A most
pointed encomium has been passed on them
by one of our most judicious and trusted
chief-justices. The contrivance adopted
by Mrs. Smith and Mr. Ray was simply a
substitute for her personally entering the
association, and contracting the debt
to it. We do not see therefore that the
law can look with disapprobation on a re-

lation by which she indirectly assumed
the burdens of borrowing membership,
when it applauds the direct assumption of
them.
Bill dismissed.
JAMES FORD AND HENRY FORD vs.
WILLIAM FORD.
Words of limitation in a deed-Title by
estoppel-Aortgagorand mortgagee.
Bill in equity for partition.
ALBERT T. MORGAN and ISAIAH SCHEELINE for the plaintiff.
1. The word heirs is necessary to con-,
vey a fee by deed.-Tiedeman on Real

Prop., 27; Mattock v. Brown, 103 Pa. 16;
Oyster v. Knull, 137 Pa. 448.
2. There can be no estoppel.-Am. &
Eng. Encyc. 7 vol. 12; Brown on Negligence, 1 vol. 566; Larkin's Appeal, 38 Pa.
457; Hepburn v. McDowell, 17 S. &. R.
383; Alexander v. Kerr, 2 Rawle 83; GIrdden v. Strumpler, 52 Pa. 400; Crest. v.
Jack, 3 Watts 238; Davis v. Davis, 26 Cal.
23. Equal means of knowledge.--Brant
v. Virginia Coal and Iron Co., 93 U. S.
326; Hill v. Epley, 31 Pa. 331; Knouffv.
Thompson, 16 Pa. 357; Jaques v. Weeks,
7 Watts 261; Hood v. Falinestock, 1 Pa.
470; Savings Inst. of Cambridge, v. Littlefield, 6 Cush. 210; Hill v. Meyers, 43 Pa.
170.
FREDERICK B. MOSER for the defendant.
1. The commissioners conveyed a fee.Act of April 18, 1853, Brightly's Purdon's,
12 Ed., 1832; Grim's Appeal, 1 Grant 209;
Smyth v. Neill, 1 W. IN. C. 43; 2 Brown
on Dec. Ests. 1194; Bloodharts' Estate, 2
C. 0. 476; Bashore v. Vhisler, 3 Watts 494.
2. Where the sale is made on a purchase
money mortgage, the purchaser takes both
the equitable estate of the vendee and the
legal estate of the vendor.-1 Troubat &
Haly, 7.8; Horbach v. Riley, 7 Pa. 81;
Zeigler's Appeal, 69 Pa. 471.
3. The receipt of the money with knowledge estops the heir.-Smith & Wife v.
Warden & Alexander, 19 Pa. 424; Spragg
v. Shriver, 25 Pa. 282; Maple v. Kussart,
53 Pa. 348.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Thomas Ford died January 10th, 1867,
leaving a widow and three sons, James,
Harry and William to survive him. At
his death he was possessed of several tracts
of land in fee. The Orphans' Court authorized the administrator to sell the lands
of said decedent for the payment of debts.
On February 10, 1869, the several tracts
were sold and Martha Ford, widow of de-
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cedent, bought one tract consisting of 100
acres.
The premises of the deed to her, contained the following words, "hath granted,
bargained, sold and conveyed and by these
presents doth grant, bargain, sell and con.
vey unto the said party of the second part,
all the following described tract, etc."
On March 1, 1870, Martha Ford conveyed to her son, William Ford, his heirs
and assigns, all the above described tract
of land, the said -Martha Ford taking a
mortgage on the same for $3,000, the full
amount of the purchase money.
On June 5, 1888, MaTtha Ford died. Her
heirs who were also the heirs of Thomas
Ford, sold the above described property of
Win. Ford under foreclosure proceedings,
making all parties not joined as plaintiffs,
parties defendants.
At the foreclosure
sale said Wm. Ford bought in the property
for $3,000, paying the other two heirs
their shares, $2,000. The Sheriff's deed
contains all the operative words necessary
to convey a fee. James and Harry Ford
have filed a bill for partition.
Wm. Ford in his answer claims a fee by
virtue of the conveyance to himself and
the mortgage.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
If Thomas Ford had had only a life estate in land, there would have been nothing for the Orphans' Court to sell; Grim's
Appeal, 1 Grant 209. He had, in fact, an
estate of fee simple in the land, which is
the subject of the present controversy.
Dying, his executor solicited from the
Orphans' Court and obtained leave to sell
it for the payment of debts under the act
of March 29, 1832, 2 P. & L. 3315. He
made the sale and to his grantee, Martha
Ford made a deed, the premises of which
used the words "hath granted, bargained, sold and conveyed, and by these
presents doth grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the said party of the second part,
all the following described tract."
No
other words of the deed qualify this phrase.
It is therefore contended that Mrs. Ford
acquired under it only a life estate. It is
accurately stated by the learned editors of
Leading Cases in the American Law of
Real Property that "The rule of the common law is that in order to vest an estate
in fee simple in a natural person, the deed

of conveyance must contain an express
limitation to the said person and his heirs,
the word "heirs" being the operative term.
There are few rules of the common law
which have been so inflexibly and so constantly enforced as this, even the manifest
intention of parties to a deed being made
to give way before it." Vol. 1, 53, Hileman v. Bouslaugh, 13 Pa. 344.
The deed, however, to Mrs. Ford, was
made by the executor as the agent of the
Orphans' Court. The act of 1832 does not
expressly and we think, does not tacitly,
authorize that court to subdivide the estate of the decedent into an estate for the
life of the purchaser, and the reversion in
his heirs. And it is not at all likely that
the Orphans' Court attempted to doso unwarranted and improper an act. Were
the petition of the executor, and the decree of the court before us, we should
doubtless find in them enough to justify*
the reformation of this deed, by the insertion of the word "heirs," or to suggest a
more liberal interpretation of the words
actually used, than they ordinarily receive.
But, the record is not before us. The
means of reformation are wanting. The
words of the -deedto Mrs. Ford must therefore receive their traditional interpretation
and we must solve the controversy between these parties on the hyppthesis that
she obtained only a life estate.
Believing herself however to have obtained a fee, she, on March 1, 1870, conveyed the land to William Ford, his heirs
and assigns. This transaction imparted to
him, it need hardly be said, no greater interest than she herself had. Had he paid
the price for a fee simple he would not
have attracted to himself any interest of
other parties than his grantor. William
Ford paid none of the purchase money,
but imposed a mortgage on the land for its
entire amount. It does not appear that he
was in any way encouraged to make the
purchase and give the mortgage, by the
reversioners, James and Harry Ford. As
against them, William acquired only an
estate for the life of his grantor. He already had an undivided third in it, in fee,
subject to the life estate.
But, after the death of the widow, on
June 5, 1888, her administrator obtained a
judgment upon the mortgage to her given
by William; and thereupon he caused a
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sheriff 's sale of the mortgaged premises.
At-that time the life estate of the widow
was extinct. The mortgage had absolutely
no value, if the estate covered by it was
only a life estate. The purchaser at the
sale, however, paid $3,000 for it. It must
have been clear to the administrator, and
to James and Harry Ford, that the purchase was made on a misapprehension as
to the estate which was being acquired;
and in ignorance of the fact that the very
persons to whom the purchaser was paying the purchase money were at the instant of receiving it, intending to claim
the land precisely as if no sale had been
made. The instrumentality of the sheriff
was employed by these persons to make
the sale, but whether or not there shall be
estoppel against disputing the title acquired
by the vendee cannot depend on the nonuse, or the use of an agent, or of the sheriff, as agent, to make the sale. They practically represented to the buyer, that he
was buying the fee which they knew that
he thought he was buying; they cannot
now be heard to deny that the fee passed
to him. Miller's Appeal, 84 Pa. 391. It
cannot matter, whether this buyer was
William Ford or another person. If
Martha Ford had, subsequently to her conveyance to William, acquired from her sons
the reversion, and had accepted payment
of the mortgage from William, her fee
would have inured to him. When through
her, in the exercise of her right, they induce him, by the foreclosure proceedings,
to pay them, we think the same result follows. One who with knowledge, accepts
the proceeds of an unauthorized sale of his
property, is estopped to dispute the valedity ofthe sale. 7 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 19,
note; Maple v. Kussart, 53 Pa. 348; Cunningham's Estate, 137 Pa. 621; Onwake v.
Harbaugh, 148 Pa. 278. If in the same instrument A gives to B certain property,
and to C certain other property which B
claims, B's acceptance of the gift precludes
his disputing C's right to the property
given to him. Zimmerman v. Lebo, 151
Pa. 345; Cummings's Estate, 153 Pa. 397;
Tompkins v. Merriman, 155 Pa. 440.
We do not think Fairchild v. Dunbar
Furnace Co. 128 Pa. 485, inconsistent with
the conclusion reached by us. A was
tenant by the courtesy of what had been
his wife's lands, and his sons, who were

also hers, had the reversion. A sold certain mining rights to X, and undertook to
obtain such a concurrence in the sale by
the reversioners, as would pass their interest. This he did not do, and died. The
consideration for this sale, was a tract of
land which was conveyed to him by X.
At his death,this tract with other property,
descended to the sons. The fact that they
occupied and enjoyed this tract along with
other property that came from the father,
it was held, did not estop them from denying X the right to continue to enjoy the
mining privileges after their father's courtesy bad become extinct.
We cannot
think that if the tract had not been conveyed, they could have compelled a conveyance by a bill in equity or otherwise,
or indeed, have accepted a conveyance
voluntarily, but with knowledge that it
was intended to be the equivalent of a
continuing mining right, without estopping themselves from disputing such
right.
One of the counsel for the plaintiffs
very ably pressed on our notice, the case
of Brant v. Virginia Coal and Iron Co., 93
U. S. 326.
A having a life estate sold it
to B, who gave a mortgage for the price.
This mortgage was subsequently transferred by A to the remaindermen, who
paid a full consideration for it. They instituted foreclosure proceedings during the
life of A and the land was judicially sold to
X, who, in turn, sold it to Y. Y undertook to cut timber from the tract, after the
death of A. The remaindermen were nob
estopped from obtaining an injunction to
prevent the cutting. But it distinctly appears that Y knew that he was getting
only a life estate. When he and his
grantee were denied a fee, by the remaindermen, he was only denied that for
which he did not pay. This circumstance
distinguishes this case toto ecelo from the
one before us.
As then James and Harry Ford have
lost their estate in the land by estoppel,
no partition can be made between them and
William. The bill is therefore dismissed.
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COVMONVEALTH vs. HARRY HARRISON.

lie, to receive his share of the real estate,

after the death of my wife. If either
Harry or Nellie dies without heirs, their
Collater'a inheritancetax-.eirs- Wheth- share to go to the other heir; if both
erfaitureof issue is definite or indefinite children die without heirs their share
-Rule in ,Shelly's Case.
to go to my own heirs. My personal
Case stated.
property to go to John and Mary
MILES H. MuRR and LLEWELLYN HIL- after the death of my wife." George HarDRETIH for the Commonwealth.
rison had died in the life-time of the tes1. Nellie Harrison took a fee under the tator. Some time after the death of the
rule in Shelly's case and the act of 1855.Shelly's Case, 1 Rep. 94; Hileman v. Bous- testator, Nellie died. The commonwealth
laugh, 13 Pa. 344; Kleppner v. Laverty, insists in this case stated that the land
70 Pa. 70; Appeal of Cockins and Harper, passes to Harry by descent, and that a colIll Pa. 26; Taylor v. Taylor, 63 Pa. 481; lateral inheritance tax must be paid to it
Doebler's Appeal, 64 Pa. 9; Seybert v. Ribbert, 5 Pa. Sup. Ct. 537; Giffin's Estate, 138 of $450.
The first section of the Act of May 6,
Pa. 327; Bassett v. Hawk, 118 Pa. 94;
Little's Appeal, 117 Pa. 14; Keim'sAppeal,
1887, P. L. 79; 2 P. & L. 4485, enacts that
125 Pa. 480; Allen v. Markle, 36 Pa. 117! all estates, real, personal and mixed, passToman v. Dunlop, 18 Pa. 72; Dunwoodie ing from any person either by will or unv. Reed, 3 S.& R. 440; Findlay v. Riddle,
der the interstate laws to any person other
3 Binn. 151.
2. Defendant takesby inheritance from than father, mother, husband, wife, chilNellie and must pay the tax.-Act of dren and lineal descendents, or the wife
April 8, 1833, P. L. 316; Brightly's Purd. or widow of the son of the person dying
1067; Act of May 6, 1887, P. L. 79; Brightly's Purd. 305-368; Commonwealth v. Eck- seized, shall be subject to a tax of five dolert, 53 Pa. 102.
lars on every hundred dollars of the clear
ARTHUiR M. DEVALL and CHARLES
value of such estate. If the interest which
MCBEANS for the defendant.
was Nellie's, passes from her to Harry, by
1. The real estate passed under the the devise of their great-grandfather, no
will, the rule in Shelly's Case not apply- tax is assessable on it. If it passes by ining.-Taylor v. Taylor, 6' Pa. 481; (uthrie s Appeal, 37 Pa 9; Tyler v. Moore, 42 heritance from Nellie, to her brother, it
Pa. 374; Carroll v. Burns, 108 Pa. 386; Cur- must bear the tax.
tis v. Longstreth, 44 Pa. 297; Robins v.
The gift in the original will to the tesQuinliven, 79 Pa. 333; Stambaugh's Es- tator's wife "for her lifetime" with retate, 135 Pa. 587; Elchelberger's Estate, 135
Pa. 160; Parkhurst v. Harrower, 142 Pa. mainder to her heirs, would, if not quali432; Giffin's Estate, 138 Pa. 327; McDonald fied by the codicil, have given her a fee
v. Dunbar, 20 W. N. C. 559; Fowler's Ap- simple; under the rule in Shelly's case.
peal, 23 W. N. C. 500.
2. Lineal heirs are not subject to the The decisions on this point are too numertax.-Act of May 6, 1887, P. L. 79; Bright- ous for citation. It would follow that
ly's Purd. 305-306; Com. v. Hackett, 102 Nellie took a fee in one-fourth of the land
Pa. 505; Waugh's Appeal, 78 Pa. 442; Com. by inheritance from the widow, which at
v. William's Executors, 13 Pa. 29.
her death was inherited by her brother.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The codicil however, makes it plain, that
The will of John A. Harris dated Nov. the testator supposed he had given to
29, 1880, contained the following clause:
George Harrison, an undivided half of the
"After my death my property belongs to land. He there directs that the heirs Qf
my wife for her lifetime; after her death to George Harrison, Harry and Nellie, are
go to her heirs in equal shares. A certain
"to receive his. share of the real eslot of four acres of land, being a part of the tate." Amendedby the codicil the devise
old farm, I give and bequeath to my two is therefore, of all the land, to the widow
grand children, George and Mary Harrison for her life, and after her death, of onein equal shares. In case one of the children
half of it, to Harry and Nellie. Thus a
dies, the property to go to the other. In
fee in remainder is bestowed upon them.
case both the children die, the property to What is the effect of the limitation over
go back to my own heirs." A codicil of on death without heirs? If either dies
October 18, 1886, was as follows: "The without heirs, his or her share is to go to
heirs of George Harrison, Harry and Nel- the other. Heirs then is equivalent to
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heirs of the body. Cole's v. Ayres, 156
Pa. 197; Cochran v. Cochran, 127 Pa. 486;
Vail v. Ward, 1 Forum 161.
But, die without heirs, when? No time
is specified. If an indefinite failure is
meant, the estate in Nellie and Harry remains a fee simple, for though at common
law this limitation would have cut down
the fee simple to a fee tail, the fee tail
would be instantly reconverted to a fee
simple by the act of April 27, 1855, 1 P. &
L. 1882. The estate depending on it would
be annulled, and on the death of either
Harry or Nellie seised of the interest, it
would pass under the intestate law to the
survivor.
It is likely we think, that the death
without heirs contemplated by the testator
was a death during the lifetime of the
widow.
He apparently expected his
widow to survive him. To her he gave a
life estate. The grand-children were not
to take possession of the land until her
death. He was probably providing, when
he directed how the land should go over,
on the death of Nellie or Harry, for a death
before the time when they were to take
possession. Ralston v. Truesdell, 178 Pa.
429. But, they have survived the widow.
The condition on which the cross limitatation over from Nellie and Harry was to
take place, has not been realized.
If we should interpret the testator to
mean by the expression "dies without
heirs" a death before the testator, King v.
Frick, 135 Pa. 575, Coles v. Ayres, 156 Pa.
197; Vail v. Ward, 1 Forum, 161, the limitation over has equally failed to take effect.
An absolute fee simple vested in the grandchildren at the instant of the testator's
death.
There is no other possible interpretation.
The death without heirs, was either a
death at any time (an indefinite failure of
issue); or a death before the widow, but
after the testator; or a death before the testator. In the first case, Harry and Nellie
took a fee simple by statutory enlargement
of a fee tail; and in the second and third
cases, a fee simple subject to a conditional
limitation whidh has never taken effect.
Nellie was therefore seized at her death of
an undivided fourth of the land in fee simple, which devolved upon her brother, her
next of kin.
It may be well, in order to avoid mis-

conception, to add that no question arises,
in this case, as to the "certain lot of four
acres." That lot seems to have been devised directly to the grand-children. The
phrase "in case one of the children dies,
the property to go to the other" must, we
think, mean in case he dies in the lifetime
of the testator, since no life estate being
given in this lot to the widow, the death
of the testator was the time when the devise was to take effect in possession.
It follows that the commonwealth is entitled to judgment, for $450.
FRANCIS FITHIAN, TO THE USE OF
HENRY TINIANS vs. SOBIESKI
HOKLER.
A fiorgery cannot be ratified-Estoppel
may precludeforgery as a defence.
Sci. fa. sur mortgage.
ADAIr HERmAN and A. FRANK JOHN

for the plaintiff.
1. One who with knowledge treats a
transaction as valid waives his right to
disaffirm it.-Woltjen v. Lauer, 2 Leg.
Ree. 194; Adams v. Sage, 28 N. Y. 103;
Masson v. Boret, 1 Denio 73; Harper v.
Jeffries, 5 Whar. 41.
2. Defendant is estopped from alleging
forgery. -Coin. v. Moltz, 10 Pa. 530; Hill
v. Epley, 31 Pa. 331-335; Sergeant's Executor v. Ewing, 80 Pa. 7.5; Chapman v.
Chapman, 59 Pa. 214-18-19; Martin v. Ives,
17 S. &. R. 366.

3. A forged instrument may be confirmed or adopted.-Garret v. Gonter, 42
Pa. 143.

EDWIN G. HUTCHINSoN and B. JOHNSON MACEwNEN for the defendant.

1. No estoppel arises from defendant's
conduct. Henry Christian B. and L.
Ass'n v. Walton, 181 Pa. 201.
2. The assignee of a bond assumes all
its defects.-Frantz v. Brown, 1 P. & W.
261; Lane v. Smith, 103 Pa. 420; Hoopes
v. Beale, 90 Pa. 82; Clark on Cont. 536.
3. The law does not permit the ratification of a crine.-B. &. L. Ass'n v. Walton,
181 Pa. 201; Shisler v. Vandyke, 92 Pa.
449; McHugh v. Schuylkill Co., 67 Pa.
395; Lyon v. Phillips, 106 Pa. 66.
4. The person undertaking to ratify
must have full knowledge of the material
facts.-Combs v. Scott, 12 Allen 493; Pittsburgh and Steubensville R. R. v. Gazzam,
32 Pa. 340; Miller v. Board of Education,
44 Cal. 166; Drakely v.' Gregg, 75 U. S. 267;
Titus v. Cairs R. 1. Co., 46 N. J. 393.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Francis Fithian executed a mortgage to
himself for $2,000 on a certain house and
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lot belonging to Sobieski Hokler, in the
name of Hokler, whose name he forged.
He also executed two bonds, each for $1,000
payable to himself by Hokler. One of
these bonds he assigned for full value to
Tinians who had no knowledge of the
forgery. Fithian subsequently informed
Holder of the forgery but stated that the
money he had obtained on the mortgage
he had paid to a creditor of Hokler named
Simlar, and as a proof of the payment, he
produced a receipt from Simlar, which,
however, was forged. Under the belief
of the genuineness of the Simlar receipt,
he (Hokler) paid two installments of the
interest as it fell due on the Tinians bond,
in all $120.
Under the same belief, Hokler when applied to by Homer Norton to whom Fithian had offered for sale the other bond, informed him that he had no defense to the
bond and mortgage and would pay it at
maturity; thereupon Norton bought the
bond for$900. The mortgage was assigned
to Tinians for himself as to the bond assigned to him and as trustee for him who
should become assignee for the other.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This scirefaciasis sued out on the mortgage. The two bonds which the mortgage
was given to secure, have been assigned by
the mortgagee, one to Tinians and the other
to Norton. Those assignments carried
with them a proportional interest in the
mortgage. Under the plea of non est facturn, the execution of the mortgage and
bonds has been denied by the defendant.
He, in fact, did not execute them. They
were forged by Fithian, the obligee and
mortgagee. In his favor, therefore, there
could be no recovery. The question before
us is, whether his assignees occupy a better position.
Tinians purchased the bond at par
without suspicion of its want of genuineness. No act of Hokler induced this purchase, or the error under which it was
made. If Hokler is liable on the mortgage, he is so solely because, with knowledge of its being a forgery, he ratified it,
by the act of paying two installments of
interest. Such payment manifests a purpose to assume and perform the obligation
expressed in the mortgage, that is, if efficient at all, it is a ratification or adoption.

In this state, however, validity cannot be
given to a forged bond or mortgage by a
mere ratification. Building & Loan Association v. Walton, 181 Pa. 201; McHugh
v. County of Schuylkill, 67 Pa. 391; Shisler
v. Vandike, 92 Pa. 447. In Garrett v.
Gonter, 42 Pa. 143, a mortgage had been
executed by A, in the name of B, under
what pretended to be a power of attorney
from B, but which was forged. Strong J.,
holds that B could ratify or adopt the
mortgage, but he does not hold that the
power of attorney could have been ratified.
If there had been no power of attorney,
the mortgage might have been adopted.
The forged power was as ineffectual as no
power, but the principal in whose name
the mortgage was made without previous
authorization, could adopt it. In Shisler
v. Vandike, one whose name had been endorsed on a note could not, by acknowledging the endorsement, and expressing
the purpose to pay the note, after it had
been brought by X so ratify it thatX could
compel him to pay it as endorser. As
against Tinians, Hokler's defense is
valid.
Is the position of Norton better than
that of Tinians? Norton applied to Hokler, before purchasing the bond, in order
to ascertain whether he had any defence
to it. He denied that he had any, and
said that he would pay it at maturity.
Thereupon Norton bought it for $900. In
this transaction exist all the elements of
an estoppel in pals. It was Hokler's duty
to speak, if he intended to dispute the
genuineness of the bond and mortgage.
He dissipates all fear, from Norton's mind,
and thus induces him to buy them. If he
is not esiopped, it is because one whose
name is forged, cannot estop himself from
asserting the forgery. We have searched
in vain for authority to sustain such a
principle. In Building and Loan Ass. v.
Walton, 181 Pa. 201, supra, Fell J., remarks: "Nor was there evidence of any
act of the defendant upon which to base
an equitable estoppel." The possibility of
such estoppel is assumed by Strong J., in
Garret v. Gonter, 42 Pa. 143. Cases in
which parties have been estopped by negligence or other acts, from refusing to pay
altered notes, are numerous. Van Duzer
v. Howe, 21 N. Y. 531. Acts that induce
a party to alter his position, will estop
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from alleging an instrument to be a forgery.. Dodge v. National Exchange
Bank of Columbus, 20 0. St. 234; Woodruff v. Munroe, 33 Md. 147; Casco Bank v.
Keene, 53 le. 103; Weed v. Carpenter, 4
Wend. 219; 1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1185,
1186.
A double forgery was committed by
Francis Fithian. He not only fabricated
the bonds and the mortgage, but the better to impose on Holder, the receipt of
Simlar, a creditor of Hokler. It was under the influence of the statement of
Fithian that he had with the proceeds of
the mortgage paid Simlar, and of the receipt bearing Simlar's name, that he became willing to adopt and assume the
obligation of the bonds. But Norton is in
no way responsible for the deception. He
did not know that Hokler was influenced
by it. He did not even know that the
bond he was buying had not been executed by Hokler. Hokler knew it was
forged, but told Norton that he had no
defence to it. That he would not thus
have misled Norton, had he not him-elf
been misled, does not make the act the
less an estoppel. Under the admitted
facts therefore, gentlemen of the jury, you
have no alternative to rendering a verdict
for the Norton bond.

Guaranty is not binding without acceptance. The contract of guaranty is vague
and indefinite as to time. Kay v. Alien,
9 Pa. 320; Unangst v. Hibler, 26 Pa. 150;
Kellogg v. Stockton, 29 Pa. 460; Story on
Contracts, p. 555; Babcock v. Bryant, 12
Pick. 133. There was no notice of amounts
furnished to Harris. Clark et al. v. Remington, 11 Mete. 361; Mussey v. Rayner,
22 Pick. 293. Guaranty is non-continuing.
Anderson v. Blakely, 2 W. & S. 237;
Aldricks v. Higgins, 16 S. & R. 212.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Caplon, a wholesale dry goods merchant,
was applied to by Amos Harris, for goods
from time to time, which were furnished.
When Harris' debt grew to $347, Caplon
objected to further sales on credit, in the
absence of security. Harris then procured from Saktone, a paper of this purport: "I will be responsible to the amount
of $1,500 for any balance due on account of
goods sold or to be sold by John Caplon to
Amos Harris. [Signed], Samuel Saktone,
August 17, 1896." This being delivered to
Caplon, he continued to sell goods in quantities whose values were $193, $217, $341,
$417, $266, $912 respectively. Payments on
account were made -from time to time, of
the following amounts: $100, $250, $210,
$300, $275, $50, $75, $190. Harris, after the
first three purchases following Saktone's
guaranty, gave Caplon his note for $400
payable six months after date, on Caplon's
JOHN CAPLON vs. SAMUEL SAKTONE. expressing a desire for additional security.
Two months after the last sale had been
Guarantors-Assignment for bonefit o.f made, Harris made an assignment in trust
creditors- Partialpayment of debt will for the benefit of creditors. A dividend of
not discharge Guarantor-Guarantor,
to be bound, must have notice of accept- 49 per cent, was received from this estate
by Caplon. He brings assumpsit on the
ance of hispromise.
guaranty for the remainder.
Assumpsit.
The import of Saktone's guaranty is
MARTIN HERR and 0. G. MCCANDLESS
quite obvious. It contemplates goods alfor plaintiff.
ready "sold or to be sold." It assumes a
There was a sufficient consideration for
defendant's guaranty. 9 Am. and Eng. liability not merely for the first $1,500
Ency. of Law, 70; Paul v. Stackhouse, 38 worth of goods to be sold, but. for "any
Pa. 302; Standley v. Miles, 36 Miss. 434; balance due on -account" of such goods.
M Naught v. McClaughry, 42 N. Y. 22. The parties had in view successive sales
A creditor, after crediting his claim with and successive payments, and Saktone
unthe amount received from the assignee, is
not debarred from collecting any balance dertook for any excess at any time of the
due. 3 Am. and Eng. Ency. of Law, 156; sum of all the sales over the sum of all the
Sanborn v. Norton, 59 Tex. 308. The ac- payments. The existing excess, after deceptance of a promissory note which pro- ducting the dividend from the assigned
vides for the extension of time will not
discharge the guarantor. Miller v. Spain, estate is nearly $700.
The defendant urges several reasons
41 Ohio 376; 5 Lawson Property Rights,
p. 4113.
why there should be no recovery against
J. THomPsoN CALDwELL and MARTIN him. These we will consider seriatim.
WOLF for defendant.
1. It is suggested that no notice was given
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by Caplon to Saktone, that he had accepted the guaranty. He in fact accepted it,
for, as the jury might well infer, he continued to sell goods to Harris, after his receipt of Saktone's undertaking and he
would not have done so, but for that undertaking.
But, the decisions require
more than this acceptance. The guarantee
must notify the guarantor thereof. The
Pennsylvania cases do not distinguish between notice before action in reliance on
the guaranty, of the intention to rely on
it, and notice after such action. We are
not prepared to hold that Caplon was required before he gave any credit to the
guarantee, to inform Saktone that he was
going to give such credit.
We are of
opinion, however, that within a short
time after his first sale, he should have
notified Saktone of it, in order that Saktone might realize that the responsibility
which he had proffered had been accepted.
Gardner v. Lloyd, 110 Pa. 278; Coe v.
Buehler, 110 Pa. 366; Evans v. McCormick, 167 Pa. 247; Kay v. Allen, 9 Pa. 320;
Unangst v. Hibler, 26 Pa. 150; Kellogg v.
Stockton, 29 Pa. 460; Bay v Thompson,
1 Pears. 551.
Six sales at intervals occurred and Saktone had no intimation
that they had been made, or that they
had been made in reliance on his assumption. He is therefore not responsible.
2. It is urged that the taking by CapIon of the note for $400, discharges pro
tanto, Samuel Saktone. This result, it is
said is wrought in either of two ways. (a)
The note was a payment of so much of
the account, or (b) by accepting it, Caplon agreed to extend the credit for six
months. A promissory note may be received in payment of a book account, but
in this state, the mere receipt of it is not
psima facie evidence that it was taken as
payment. Hutchinson v. Woodwell, 107
Pa. 509; McCartney v. Kipp, 171 Pa. 644;
Weakly v. Bell, 9 W. 273; Kemmerer's
Appeal, 102 Pa. 558. We know nothing of
the purpose of the parties in making and
accepting this note. It must therefore be
deemed to be merely a collateral security
for the book account.
In accepting it, did Caplon agree to give
time? The principle is thoroughly established that an agreement supported by
a consideration by the creditor with the
debtor to give the latter time, without the

consent of the surety, endorser, or guarantor, will discharge such surety, endorser
or guarantor. Siebeneck v. Anchor Saving's Bank, 111 Pa. 187. But it is equally
well settled in Pennsylvania, that the acceptance of the debtor's promissory note
payable at a future day by the creditor
does not establish an agreement to wait
until that day. Hutchinsonv. Woodwell,
107 Pa. 509. Cf. Bank of Pennsylvania v.
Potius, 10 W. 148.
(3.) The estate of Harris was assigned
for the benefit of his creditors. It was in
relief of Saktone that Caplon proved his
claim and received therefrom 49 per cent.
of the debt. A debtor does not discharge
himself from his debts, by making an assigUnient of the benefit of his creditors. For
any residue of his debts, after the application thereto, of the proceeds of the assigned
property, he remains individually liable.
It need hardly be remarked that an acceptance from the principal of a partial
payment of the debt, does not discharge
the guarantor.
For error in our instruction to the jury,
the verdict for the plaintiff is set aside and
a new trial is awarded.
Milesburg Building and Loan Association, now
for the use of J. Lincoln Miller, vs. John Miller, William Miller, J. Lincoln Miller, George
Miller and Mrs. Mary Butler.

Illortgage- Payment - Satisfaction- Assignment-As securityfor debt owing to
mortgagee's assignee.
Sei. fa. &urmortgage.
JACKSON ORLANDO HAAS and FRANK
J. LAUBENSTEIN for the plaintiff.
1. Consideration is not essential to the
assignment of a mortgage. -Am. and Eng.
Encyc. 15 vol. 843; Sicard v. Davis, 31 U.
S. 124; Adair v. Adair, 5 Mich, 204; Jackson v. Eaton, 20 Johns. 4 8; 0. & U. W.
R W. v. Nicoes, 57 111. 464
2. No resulting
trust. -Barnett v.
Dougherty, 32 Pa. 371.
3. Money advanced on the same mortgage may be recovered on a sci. fa.-Farnum v. Burnett, 21 N. J. E. 87; Garber v.
Henry, 6 Watts 57; Moroney's Appeal, 24
Pa. 372; Friedley v. Hamilton, 17 S. & R.
70; Irwin v. Tabb. 17 S. & R. 418; Walden
v. Ph. Ins. Co., 5 Johns. 320; Mauffitt's
Adm. v. Rynd, 69 Pa. 389; Anderson v.
Neff, 11 S. & R. 207; Springville S. F. & L.
Ass'n v. fRaber, 11 Phila. 546.
FRANCIS LAFFERTY. and WILLIAM M.
FLANNIGAN for the defendants.

THE FORUM.
1. There was no consideration and a resulting trust arose.-Hasel v. Beilstein, 179
Pa. 560; Boyd v. M'Leau, 1 Johns. Cli.
582; Midmer v. Midmer's Executors, 26 N.
J. E. 299; Livermore v. Aldrich et. at., 59
Mass. 434.
2. The assignee of a mortgage takes it
subject to all the equities existing between
the mortgagor and mortgagee.-Goiger v.
Peterson, 164 Pa. 352; Morgan's Appeal,
126 Pa. 500; Theyken v. Machine Co., 109
Pa. 95; Bank v. Thomas, 19 W. N. C. 515;
Hexter v James, 1 Leg. Rec. 194; Mott v.
Clark, 9 Pa. 398; Ashton's Appeal, 73 Pit.
153.
3. One of several tenants in common
cannot purchase a mortgage for the purpose of depriving the other of their interest.-Fisher et. at. v. Hartman et. at 165
Pa. 16.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

On August 17, 1872, James Miller gave
a mortgage for $600 to the Milesburg B.&
L. Association, and on August 2, 187.5,
died intestate. No letters of administration upon the estate, were ever issued.
The five children agreed with each other
and their mother, the widow, Mrs. Eliza
Miller, to contribute monthly, so much as
was needed to pay the dues to the association, upon the mortgage, and after her
death, to sell the premises, and equally divide among themselves the proceeds. The
widow died April 2-5, 1895. The children
made unequal payments upon the mortgage. One of them, Mary Butler, contributed $13 per month, but J. Lincoln
Miller, one of them, made none. The widow
also made some payments. J. Lincoln
Miller sent to his mother during her lifetime for her support, a considerable sum
of money, probably $500. On November 30, 1881, the building association assigned to himn the mortgage, which had
already been fully paid. The object of the
aisignment, on Lincoln's part, was to secure a home for the mother during her
life, the mortgage being for as much as the
premises were worth. This scire facias
on the mortgage is sued out, for the use of
J. Lincoln Miller, against himself and the
other heirs, as terre-tenants.
On these facts, it is entirely clear that
there can be no recovery- The mortgage
was paid at various times, in small
amounts, and the association might have
assigned it to any one of the payers, to secure him for any excess of his contributions
above those of the others. But those who

made the payments did not solicit an assignment. After the mortgage became
extinct by full payment, J. Lincoln Miller, who made no payments, procured an
assignment of it. He paid nothing for it.
He was cognizant of the fact that it iad
been paid in full. But had he given a full
consideration and been ignorant of the
payment, the assignment would not avail
him its against the land, since the mortgage was in fact paid. Theyken v. Howe
Machine Co., 109 Pa. 95; Reineman v.
Robb, 98 Pa. 474; 3 Liens, 236.
It has been held that a judgment which
has been paid, may by the agreement of
the debtor and creditor, be continued to
secure the payment of a new debt, Pierce
v. Black, 105 Pa. 343; and such an agreement will even preserve the lien of the
judgment, as against liens acquired by
others subsequently to the agreement,
Merchants' National Bank v. Mosser, 161
Pa. 468. It is possible that had the terretenants agreed with the Building Association, that the latter although paid might
.assign the mortgage to J. Lincoln Miller
to secure another debt, and in consequence
of buch agreement, had the association assigned the mortgage to secure the repaymnent of moneys paid by him to their
mother, he could maintain this seite
facias. On no other conditions could he
do so. N o such agreement has been made.
It does not even appear that Lincoln has
any claim against the other heirs, for any
contributions he made to the support of
his mother. The only contract that appears was to pay the mortgage, sell the
premises at the mother's death and equally
divide the proceeds. Under this contract,
on a sale of the premises, those who made
the payments would have a right to reimbursement, and only the residuum would
be divided equally. So far as appears, the
moneys paid by Lincoln to his mother
were a pure gratuity, for which he contemplated no compensation. Had it been
made to appear that the agreement wits
that the five children should contribute
money both for the widow's support and
for the discharge of the mortgage, and that
all thus contributing should be reimbursed
out of the proceeds of sale, and had it appeared that, in pursuance of such an agreement Lincoln paid moneys to his mother,
while the others paid money to the Asso-
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ciation, he would paripassu with them,
have had a right to reimbursement. The
case is destitute of any facts that would
justify the acquisition of the mortgage by
Lincoln, and its enforcement against the
land.
The verdict therefore must be for the defendant.
PATRICK DENNIS, JR., vs.. CHARLES
THROCKNORTON.
Binding effect of agreement under seal8peciftc performance of contract- Will
made after written contract does not annul the contract.
Bill in Equity.
CLARENCE GILLILAND and WALTER J.
HENRY for the plaintiff.
The sealed contract can be enforced.Candor and Henderson's Appeal. 27 Pa.
119; Cooch v. Goodman, 2 Q. B. 580; Darr
v. Munsell, 13 Johns, (N. Y.) 430; Page v.
Trdfant, 2 Mass. 159; Wallace v. Miner. 6
Ohio 367; Doughty v. Miller, 50 N. J. E.
529.
A will made subsequent toa written contract does not take the place of or annul
the written contract. Hill v. Groom, 1
Beav. 540, Van Dyne v. Vreeland, et. al.,
11 N. J. E. 370; Meek's Appeal, 97 Pa. 313;
Schutt v. Miss. Soc. M. E. Church, et. al.,
41 N. J. E. 115.
S. H. MILLER and ELI SAULS1URY for
the defendant.
No further proceeding can be had until
an account shall have been taken in the
proper Orphans' Court of the debts and
assets of the estate and the amount be ascertained.
Rhone's 0. C. Practice, Vol. II, p. 278.
Equity will not enforce the contract

specifically. Cooper v. Penna, 21 Cal. 404.
Equity will endcavor to do perfect and
complete justice.
Mass. 244.

Jones v. Menhall, 115

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Patrick Dennis, Sr., and Patrick Dennis, Jr., and Thomas Buck agreed to form
a partnership association, the Dennis' and
Buck contributing respectively $50,000.
Patrick Dennis agreed by a sealed writing
with his son, that he would contribute
$30,000, the son $20,000, and that, on the
death of either, he should bequeath his
shares to the survivor. The money was
accordingly contributed, the association
organized, business commenced and conducted for seven years. Then Patrick
Dennis, Sr., died, leaving a will in which

he gave $2,000 to his widow, gave equal
shares in the residue of his estate, except
the stock in the association, to his son
Patrick, and to his daughter Mary; and
gave the stock in the association to hisson
Patrick, charged however, with the payment of all his private debts, amounting
to $3,450, and with the payment of an annuity of $350 to the widow. Patrick, the
son, has never made a will. The shares
of stock have no market value, never having been sold. This bill is filed against the
executor of Patrick Dennis' will, to require
him to transfer to Patrick, the plaintiff,
(son) the $30,000 of shares held by the decedent at his death.
OPINION OF THE

COURT.

The agreement between the Dennises was
tlat on the death of either the survivor
should become the owner of his shares in
the-association. Itimpliedly stipulated that
these shares should not be aliened during
life, except to the other party to the contract, and that, if not alienated, they
should be bequeathed to the survivor. A
contract for a conveyance by A's heirs at
A's death, to B, is valid. Meck's Appeal,
97 Pa. 313.- It is easy to infer then, that
a contract to prevent the devolution of
land on the heirs, by devising it to the
party with whom the contract is made, is
enforceable. Logan v. McGinnis, 12 Pa.
27; Kauss v. Rohner, 172 Pa. 481, as is a
contract not to alien or devise the land away
from the heir. Carson v. Cemetery Co.
104 Pa. 575; Taylor v. Mitchell, 87 Pa. 518;
Cf. King's Estate, 150 Pa. 143; Wall's Appeal, 111 Pa. 464. The contract between
the father and son provided for an unconditional bequest of each to the other of his
shares of stock. The father's bequest
charging on the son in respect of it the
payment of his debts, and an annuity to
the widow of $350, is not a fulfillment of
the agreement.
Equity is asked specifically to enforce
this contract. It is too well settled to need
discussion, that a promise, not supported
by a consideration will not be specifically
performed. But, the Dennis promise was
not gratuitous. For the father's promise,
he received, (1) the son's contribution of
$20,000 to the business, and (2) the son's
promise to bequeath his shares therein to
him; (3) the embarkation in the business
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and its conduct for seven years by the son.
These were surely ponderable considerations.
An obstacle to the specific enforcement
of the contract it is urged, is the existence
of debts to the amount of $3,450, and the
absence of personal property from which
to pay them. We do not think that these
debts prevent the performance of the contract. By that contract, the son acquired
a species of interest in the father's shares.
He was a purchaser of that interest. The
right of creditors of the father, to-resort to
his estate, is subordinate to the right of
the son, to the transfer of the shares at the
death of the former.
In the vast majority of cases in which
the chancellor is asked to specifically excute contracts, the subject matter of the
contract is land. Performance of sales of
chattels is ordinarily not coerced, because
compensation in damages, the remedy furnished by an action at law, is deemed an
equivalent. 3 Pomeroy, Equity, 1402.
Equity courts are reluctant for this reason
to compel a transfer of shares of stock.
Dungan v. Dohnert, 11 W. N. C. 330, n.;
Edelman v. Latshaw, 159 Pa. 644. But
when the shares have no market value,
when possession of them will give peculiar
advantages to the party, and the securing
to him of these advantages was one of the
objects contemplated in the contract, the
courts will compel the conveyance of
shares of stock. Goodwin Gas Stove Company's Appeal, 117 Pa. 514; Hepworth v.
Henshall, 153 Pa. 592; Johnson v. Brooks,
93 N. Y. 337; 22 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 993.
In Foll's Appeal, 91 Pa. 434, the court declined to compel A to transfer, as he had
agreed, to B, 15 shares ofstock in a national
bank, with a view to giving B the control of
the bank, because, the bank being a quasipublic corporation, it was not sound policy
to assist one man to get such control. The
partnership of which the Dennises were
members, was purely private. It was entirely legitimate for each to desire to retain after the death of the other, the ascendency in the concern which had been
had from their concert. The shares have
no well known market value. The deprivation of the son of a controlling voice in
the business may induce losses to him
which cannot be estimated with any precision, and for which any attainable corn-

pensation might prove wholly inadequate.
We think specific performance an appropriate remedy.
Crofut v. Layton, 68
Conn. 91.
The plaintiff, the son, has never made a
will, and it is suggested that for this reason, not having performed his undertaking, he is not now in a position to enforce
that of his deceased father. Of the agreement of the parties, a bequest is a purely
modal performance. The substance of the
agreement is that the shares should beconie the survivor's. Had the son died
first and intestate, the father would have
been aided by a court of equity, to procure
a conveyance of the shares. The contract
did not require the making of a will, at
tiny particular time. It cannot be broken
by the son until his death, and it can
never be broken now, for the condition on
which the bequest was to be made, viz:
the father's survival, has not happened.
Let a decree be drawn up in conformity
with the prayer of the bill.
SAMUEL ROBBINS vs. CHARLES
DOBBINS.
Bailment-Bailee'slien for board of horse
bailed-Agency- Undisclosed principal
-Quasi contract.
Assumpsit.
MERKEL LANDIS and HERMAN
PHERD for the plaintiff.

M. SY-

1. The agency may be implied from
the relation of the parties.-Willianis .v.
McKinley, 65 Fed. Rep. 4; Kribs v.
O'Grady, 58 Am. Dec. 312; Bank v. Bank,
16 N. Y. 145; Norton v. Bull, 43 Mo. 113;
Hull v. Jones, 69 Mo. 587.
2. A private agent acting for an undisclosed principal is prima facie liable.Welch v. Goodwin, 123 Mass. 71; Pond v.
Clark, 57 N. Y. 653; Cobb v. Knapp, 71 N.
Y. 348. No privity of contract between
Charles Dobbins, Jr., and Samuel Robbins.
-Smith's Leading Cases, 1659; New Zealand Land Co. v. Watson, 7 Q. B. D. 374.
3. Bailee has a right to detain the thing
bailed until compensated.-Trickett on
Liens, 2 vol. 729; Young v. Kimball, 23 Pa.
193; Buckner v. Croissant, 3 Phila. 219.
MISS JULIA A. RADLE and GEo. W.
AUBREY for the defendant.

1. The action should be brought against
Charles Dobbins, Jr., instead of Charles
Dobbins.-Hale on Bailments, 52; Harter
v. Beauchard, 64 Barb. 617; DuBois v. D.
& H. Canal Co., 4 Wendell 288; Jackson v
Brown, 5 Wendell 592; Fox v. Drake, 8
Cowen 191; Butler's Appeal, 26 Pa. 63;
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Hays & Nick v. Lynn, 7 Watts 524;
Moore's Executors v. Patterson, 28 Pa.
502; Fulveiler v. Baugher, 15 S. & R. 45;
Youghiogheny Iron Co. v. Smith, 66 Pa.
340. Bailee acquired a lien.-3 Trickett on
Liens, 555; Cadwalader v. Dilworth, 26 W.
N. 0. 32; Williams v. Smith, 153 Pa. 462;
Hartman v. Keown, 101 Pa. 338; Bayle v.
Lukens, 2 Del. 383.
2. The right to recover the $48 is denied.-Sand v. Martin, 2 vol. Forum 10;
Hale on Bailments 220; Evans on Agency,
126.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Dobbins received a horse from his son.
(who was going to Europe) to keep until
his return. Being i.hus in charge of the
horse, he arranged with Robbins that
Robbins should keep the horse at his
livery stable, feed him and tend him. for
$4 per week. After Robbins had kept the
horse four weeks, Dobbins notified him by
writiig, that the horse was not his, and
that he would no longer be responsible for
his keep, but did not offer to take the
horse away, nor indicate to whom it could
be returned. Robbins on the same day
sent a messenger to Dobbins, and stated
through him, that he would return the
horse to Dobbins that afternoon, but Dobbins forbade, saying that he would not receive it. The horse then continued with
Robbins for twelve weeks longer. He
brings this action for sixteen weeks board;
$64.
It is immaterial, for the decision of this
case, how we classify the relation of Charles
Dobbins to the horse of his son. He was
not its owner. He was its depository or
its mandatory, Hale, Bailments, 41 et
passim. It was in his custody, and a part
of the task he assumed with respect to it,
was duly to house, feed and tend it.
Whether his situation was such that the
son must have known that he could not
perform this task, except by means of a
livery stable keeper, does not appear, nor
is it important. The horse was in the possession of Dobbins, and he had a right to
place it in the charge of Robbins. No one
is contesting that right. He agreed with
Robbins to pay him $4 weekly, if he, the
latter, would take the horse and give him
his keep The horse was received, in pursuance of the contract, by Robbins. The
arrangement might probably have been
6nded at any time, by Dobbins or by Robbins; it could certainly have been ended at

the expiration of any week. It was neither
ended nor attempted to be ended, until
four weeks had elapsed. The plaintiff,
then, has a right to recover $16. Has he a
right to recover more?
At the end of four weeks, Dobbins for
the first time informs Robbins, that the
horse does not belong.to him, and declares,
both that he will not receive it from Robbins, and that he will not be responsible
for its keep. The relation between the
defendant and plaintiff was that of bailor
and bailee for mutual benefit, a locatio custodiae, or locatio operisfaciendi. It could
be terminated by either: by Dobbins on
his demanding the horse, and paying the
compensation thus discharging Robbins'
lien, Yearsley v. Gray, 140 Pa. 238; Young
v. Kimball, 23 Pa. 193; by Robbins on his
tendering the horse and declining longer
to keep it. If Dobbins had requested the
horse, after offering to pay all charges due,
Robbins could not recover for its keep
after refusing to surrender it. But Dobbins does not demand the horse. On the
contrary lie refuses to relieve Robbins of
its custody. Robbins could not properly
turn the horse loose. He would, by so
doing, have become liable for any damage
that it might commit. Goodman v. Gray,
15 Pa. 188; McIlvaine v. Lantz, 100 Pa.
586; Rossell v. Cottom, 31 Pa. 525. He was
bound to keep it confined, and he was
bound to provide food for it. Humanity
forbids the starvation of it. Even if the
contract between Dobbins and Robbins
was ended by the notification from the
former, the law casts on, him the duty of
compensating the latter for such expenses
as his enforced possession of the horse occasioned. In Preston v. Neale, 12 Gray
222, an outgoing tenant left in the house
a stove and three trunks. These being in
the way of the incoming tenant, who
nevertheless was bound to take fair care of
them, he removed them to a safe place,
and was permitted to recover compensation from their owner. In the absence of
other evidence, the contract price of $4 per
week may be assumed to be a fair recompense for the keep of the horse. Andrews
v. Keith, 168 Mass. 558. Whether under
the stray law or other law, Robbins might
have ultimately rid himself of the bailment of the horse, we are not now called
upon to decide.
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The attorneys for the defendant invoked
the principal that as the bailment of his
horse to his father, by the son, authorized
the father to make such contract of agistment as became necessary, the son was
liable, under such contract to Robbins.
Hale on Bailments, 52; Harter v. Blanchard, 64 Barb. 617. It does not follow from
that principle, that Charles Dobbins is
not also liable. He made the contract.
He did not disclose his principal. He did
not inform Robbins that he was not the
owner of the horse.
He then became
personally liable; Clark Contracts, 740.
The motion for a non-suit is overruled.

Brown 18 Hun 571; Billings v. Robinson,
94 N. Xi. 415; Isham v. Buckingham, 49
N. Y. 216; Harrison's Case, L. R. 6 Ch. 286.
3. As long as the affairs of a corporation are carried on in good faith, creditors
cannot interfere in the corporate manaement.-Taylor on Priv. Corp., 639. hspecially, if acts complained of were done
before their claims arose.-Taylor on Priv.
Corp., 618; Graham v. Railroad Co., 102
U. S. 148.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The American Manufacturing Company
was a corporation, making agricultural implements. Of these A had sold $19,000
worth to X, taking X's note in payment,
with a mortgage as a security. Jamison
was a shareholder in the company to the
JAMES FARLEY ET AL. vs. AIERICAN
extent of $1,000, the entire stock being
FG. CO. AND JACOB JAIVIISON.
$40,000. On Aug. 3, 1894, the company
An insolvent corporation cannotpurchase agreed to buy Jamison's stock, and in
its own shares-Nor reduce its assetsActual fraud not necessary-Assignec payment to transfer to him $1,000 of its
for benefit of creditors represents the claim against X. Notes to the extent of
consignor and does not acquirethe rights $1,000 were handed back to X who at the
of creditors.
same time made two notes for $500 each,
payable directly to Jamison, with a warBill in equity, to declare sale o stock
rant of attorney to confess judgment and
void, etc.
abundantly secure.
On this day, the
CHARLES S. SHALTERS and G. FRANK
corporation was insolvent, in the sense
WETZEL for the plaintiffs.
that its matured liabilities greatly exceed1. The assets of a corporation are a
trust fund for the payment of its debts,
ed its money on hand, and such additionand the claims of its shareholders are sub- al money as it could hope to obtain
ordinate to the claims of its creditors.by sale of any of its property within a
Taylor on Private Corporations, Sec. 654,
reasonable time. It continued, however,
655; Am. and Eng. Encyc. 23 vol. 856;
Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U. S. 610; Lane's Ap- to do business, making and selling mapeal, 105 Pa. 60; Bell's Appeal, 115 Pa. 92.
chinery for four months; during which time
Creditors may follow corporate assets.it paid oft some debts that were mature on
Taylor on Priv. Corp., see. 656, 669, 552,
Aug. 3, 1894, but contracted new debts in
813; Sawyer v. Upton, 91 U. S. 60; Wood
v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308; R. R. v. Howard,
excess of those thus paid. At the end of
74 U. S. 393.
the four months, an action for $1,500 begun
2. An insolvent corporation cannot pursome time before, was nearly ready for
chase its own Shares, even when there is
trial, and the corporation, seeing no way
no actual frafid.-Taylor on Priv. Corp.,
see. 135, page 105, note; Columbian Bank's
of continuing business, made an assignEst., 147 Pa. 436; Coleman v. Oil Co., 51
ment in trust for the benefit of its crediPa. 74; Am. and Eng. Encyc., 23 vol. 677.
tors, to John Farley. One of its creditors,
8. In equity, the court regards the relaon the 3 Aug., 1894, was James Macpherative rights of all the creditors.-Taylor on
Priv. Coip., sec. 669, 513; Jamison's Es- son, whose debt was $734.09.
Horace
tate, 163 Pa. 155; Pfohl v. Simpson, 74 N.
Hadrian became a creditor, for material
Y. 137; Turnbull v. Lumber Co., 55 Mich.
sold, on Sept. 11, 1894, to the extent of
387.
$399.19. These creditors in union with
W. LLOYD SNYDER and PAUL J.
Farley, file this bill against this corporaSCHmDT for the defendants.
1. In the absence of prohibition by stat- tion and Jamison to declare the sale of the
ute, a corporation may purchase its own
stock of Jamison void, and to compel him
stodk.-Bank v. Bruce, 17 N. Y. 507; Dock
to refund the $1,000 with interest. No
v. Cordage Co., 167 Pa. 370.
actual fraud was intended by Jamison.
2. Where there is a bona fide transfer
He had quarreled with the principal stockof stock to the corporation, the stockholder
is relieved from all liability.-Neiller v.
holders and the directors and president
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and both they and he desired to sever a
relation that was no longer agreeable. It
does not appear that he knew of the exact
situation of the corporation. He did know
that it had not been prospering, and that
no dividends had been declared for two
years.
The incapacity of a corporation to pur
chase its shares of capital stock, recognized
in England, I Cook, Stocks and Stockholders 414, has not been maintained in
this country, Dock v. Schlichter Jute Cordage Co., 167 Pa. 370; although in Coleman
v. Columbia Oil Co., 51 Pa. 74, it is said
that the practice of corporations buying
their own stock is not to be commended.
It is however held in the American courts,
that the capital stock is a trust fund for
the benefit of creditors, and that the withdrawal of it from them, will be ineffectual
if the other assets of the corporation prove
insufficient to satisfy their debts. Sawyer
v. Hoag, 17 Wall. 610; Handley v. Stutz,
139 U. S. 417; Langer v. Upton, 91 U. S.
50; 23 Am. and Eng. Ency. 856; Crandall
v. Lincoln 52 Conn. 73; Columbian Bank's
Estate, 147 Pa. 422; Lane's Appeal, 105 Pa.
49; Bell's Appeal, 115 Pa. 88; If the stock
has not been fully paid in, creditors may
by a bill in equity, compel the payment of
it. Lane's Appeal, 105 Pa.49; Bell's Appeal,
115 Pa. 88. If stock having been fully
paid up, the corporation should permit
the stockholder to take out what he had
paid in upon it; the creditors could by a
bill compel him to pay back the sum thus
taken out; Buck v. Ross, 68 Conn. 29.
The Amer. Manufacturing Company, on
Aug. 3, 1894, held notes of X to the amount
of $1900 for agricultural implements, and
a mortgage securingtheir payment. Notes
to the extent of $1000 were handed back to
X, and he made new notes, payable directly to Jamison. The property of the
corporation was therefore lessened, in order to buy Jamison's shares. It is evident
that if this process had been repeated, in
favor of all the shareholders, the property
of the corporation would have been consumed in paying back to them what they
had contributed to it, and the creditors
would have been entirely unprovided for.
It is evident that this result would follow, whatever the motive of the corporation and of the shareholder, in the repurchase of the stock. For -that reason, and

for the reason that in many cases it would
be practically impossible to show what the
motive was. the purchase by the company
of its own stock, will, generally be voidable. if its avoidance becomes necessary
for the satisfaction of debts, although it
was made in good faith and although the
fact of insolvency was unknown to the
stockholder; 2 Thompson, Corporations,
. 2062. In Columbian Bank's Estate, 147
Pa. 422. an effort was made to show that
the stockholders knew of the insolvent
state of the bank, but we camnot think
that the result could have been different,
had his ignorance of such state been absolutely clear. Whatever doubt there may
be, then, as to Jamison's knowledge of the
condition of the Manufacturing Company,
it was in fact then insolvent. His withdrawal of his contribution to the stock was
then unlawful, and he must return it
Buck v. Ross, 68 Conn. 29.
The plaintiffs in the bill are Farley the
assignee, 1\.acpherson and Hadrian. Macpherson was already a creditor when Jamison sold his stock to the company, Hadrian
became such between that sale and
the assignment in trust. The American
Manufacturing Company is, along with
Jamison. the defendant. As respects the
Company and Jamison, the purchase of
his stock was perfectly valid. Neither he
nor it could avoid it. As a constructive
fraud, a diversion of trust funds from the
cestui que trust, only the cestui que trust
can take steps to annul it.
It is well
settled in Pennsylvania, that an assignee
for the benefit of creditors occupies the
position of the assignor. He does not acquire the rights of creditors. Hence, conv-eyances fraudulent as to them, he cannot
set aside. If anybody, they only can annul such conveyances. Assignments, 127;
Jordan v. Mosser, 9 Pa. C. C. 325. As respects Farley therefore, the bill must be
dismissed. But Macpherson's right to assail the purchase of the Jamison stock is
unquestionable.
As the demurrer does
not complain of the misjoinder of parties,
it must as to him be overruled. Hadrian
was not a creditor, when Jamison's stock
was bought by the Company and he did
not become such until five weeks afterwards. It is probable that, if Hadrain
had had actual knowledge of this purchase,
when he gave his credit, or if so long a
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time had then elapsed'as to repel the inference that he had given credit on the assumption that the number of shareholders
had not been reduced, he would not now
be allowed to attack the purchase, 23 Am.
and Eng. Encyc. 863. We see no facts
which preclude him from complaining
that the purchase was injurious to him.
It does not appear, in the bill, that Macpherson and Hadrian have obtained judgments and issued executions thereon, to
which the return of nulla bona has been
made. Nor, does it appear that any distribution of the assigned estate has been
made wherein there has been an adjudication upon the claims of these persons.
The demurrer, however, does not question
the right of the plaintiff for this reason to
maintain the bill. The demurrer is overruled, and the defendant ordered to answer
within the time prescribed by the rule of
court.
ESTATE OF HENRY BATTERSON,
DECEASED. EXCEPTIONS TO AUDITOR'S REPORT.
"Ifortgage-AccompanyingBond-Personalty, the .rirmar
fund for payment
of testator's debts.
FRANK H. STROUSE and FREDERICK C.
MILLER for the plaintiff.
There was no express declaration in the
will that James Batterson should take the
farm cum onere. Hoff's Appeal, 24 Pa.
200, Lennig's Appeal, 52 Pa. 135; Hirst's
Appeal, 92 Pa. 491; Rhone's 0. C. Practice, p. 212. The fact that a mortgage is
given as security does not render the obligation any the lessa debt. Hoff' s Appeal,
supra; Lennig's Appeal, supra. The
debts of a decedent must first be paid out
of the personalty. Act 24th Feb. 1834, B.
P. Dig. 591; Ramsey's Appeal, 4 W. 71.
MARTIN F. DUFFY and WALTER G.
TREIBLY for the defendant.
The auditor's report favors equality
among the children. Pyle's Appeal, 5 Pa.
Sup. Ct. 336; Stephey's Appeal, 4 Pa. Sup.
Ct. 550. The land is the primary fund for
the satisfaction of the mortgage. MNosely
v. Marshall, 27 Barb. 42; Jumel v. Jumel,
7 Paige 591; Cumberland v. Codrington, 3
Johns. Oh. R. 229; Wisner's Estate, 20
Mich. 442. There was no accompanying
bond nor express covenant in the mortgage and hence no personal liability.
Scott v. Fields, 7 V. 360; Hoffman v. See
3 V. 352; Bantleon v. Smith, 2 Binn 146.
Henry Batterson's will devised his farm
X to his son James; another farm, Y, to

his daughter Sarah, his forty shares in the
First National Bank of Mechanicsburg to
his daughter Jane. He divided the residue of his estate equally between his three
children.
The shares of stock were at
Batterson's death worth $2000. Farm Y
was worth about $1700, and farm X
about $2300.
On farm X there was a
mortgage for $700, for money borrowed
two years before, by Batterson. James,
the son, who was appointed executor, as
such, paid the mortgagee the principal
with $37 of accrued interest, and in his account, claimed credit for this payment,
and for the payment of $375 more of debts.
The daughters except to the credit of $737,
and the auditor has reported that that payinent should have been made by James,
as devisee, and not as executor, and denied to him the credit. The balance of
personalty admitted by the executor was
$2419. This was increased by $737. After
the expenses of the audit were deducted,
the residue $3000, was divided equally
among the three children. To this denial
of the credit of $737 by the auditor, James
Batterson excepts.
It is a well settled principle, that when
a debt for which the decedent is personally
liable, is also secured by a lien or charge
on land, and the land, is devised or descends, the personalty must bear the
burden of the debt, for the benefit of the
heir or devisee, Hoff's Appeal, 24 Pa. 200;
Moore's Appeal, 88 Pa. 450; Lennig's
Appeal, 52 Pa. 135; Hirst's Appeal, 92 Pa.
491; Merkel's Estate, 131 Pa. 5S4. It is
equally clear that if the deceased is not
personally liable for the lien, the lien on
his land is not payable from his personal
estate, and the land will not therefore be
exonerated thereout, unless there is a
declaration in the will of his purpose that
it be exonerated. Hirst's Appeal, 92 Pa.
481. If a mortgage is on a tract of land
when A becomes the purchaser of it, the
duty of paying the mortgage from his
personalty, on his death depends on his
having became personally liable for it. If
he did not thus become personally liable,
the mortgage is not payable from the personal estate, in relief of the devisee; Mloore's
Appeal, 88 Pa. 450; Hirst's Appeal, supra.
If he did thus become personally liable,
the devisee will be relieved; HofPs Estate,
24 Pa. 200; Lennig's Appeal, 52 Pa. 135;
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Reigelman's Estate, 174 Pa. 476. Hence
it always becomes a question whether the
grantee of land so assumed the mortgage
on it, as to do more than undertake to indemnify the grantor from the payment of
it. If he did, and the mortgagee might,
in the name of the grantor, or in his own
name, maintain an action against the
grantee for the mortgage, Merriman v.
Moore, 90 Pa. 78; on the death of the.grantee, his personal estate would have to pay
the mortgage, and thus discharge the
land from its burden, Moore's Appeal, 88
Pa. 450; In re McCracken's Estate, 29 Pa.
426.
The mortgage on the Batterson farm,
was placed on it by Batterson" for money
borrowed"1 ten years before his death.
If the mortgage was the only security for the borrowed money, if there
was given for it no bond, note, or personal
undertaking of any kind; if the lender was
to look solely to the land, by means of his
mortgage, Batterson did not become indebted for it. A mortgage in the usual
form does not impose a personal liability,
and assumpsit cannot be maintained upon
it; Baum v. Tonkin, 110 Pa. 569; Reap v.
Battle, 155 Pa. 265; Scott v. Fields, 7 W.
360; Fidelity Ins. and Trust Co. v. Miller,
89 Pa. 26; 1 Jones, Mortgages, 548; nor
must a debt of the mortgagor accompany
the mortgage. Not only may he make the
mortgage to secure the debt of anothei
person, and thus not assume any individual
liability, 2 Jones, Mortgages 241, (Edition
of 1879), but, even when it is given to secure the repayment to the mortgagee of a
second money by himself, it may be understood that the remedy on the mortgage
shall be the only remedy. 1 Jones, Mortgages, 4850; Ball v. Wyeth, 99 Mass. 338.
If such is the case, there exists no debt in
the proper sense of the word. A personal
action could not be sustained against the
mortgagor; no property of his could be
taken in execution to secure the repayment of the money. If the Batterson
mortgage was not accompanied by any
personal liability, it was not payable out
of the personal estate. The remarks of
Agnew J., in Lennig's Estate, 52 Pa. 135,
that "when encumbered by the mortgagor
for his own debt, the land is but a pledge
or security for its payment, and the primary liability rests in equity upon the

personal estate to redeem it, and this even
where no bond or covenant for the payment accompanies the pledge" must not
be so interpreted as to clash with this
principle. A bond is not necessary, nor
a note, nor a covenant or formal undertaking of any kind, in order that a personal
liability should spring up from the borrowing of money, but, if it is understood
that only the mortgaged premises are to
be answerable for the repayment, the law
will not, despite the contract, thrust a
personal liability upon the borrower.
It does not expressly appear whether
Batterson gave a bond or note for the
borrowed money. He did borrow the
money. An agreement by the lender to
look solely to the land mortgage, is so extremely rare, that we think it incumbent
on the party who alleges such an agreement to prove it. From the mere fact
of borrowing and agreeing for the repayment of the loan, a personal obligation to
repay would arise, unless excluded by explicit agreement. We must then assume
that Batterson was personally bound to repay the $70). If so, in the absence of a
clear indication that he intended his son
James to take the land devised to him
eum onore, the mortgage is payable out of
his personal estate. The auditors report
must then be.rectified.
Balance,
Deduct expense, of audit,

$2,419
156

$2,263
Payable to James Batterson, $754.33
"
" Sarah
91
754.33
"
" Jane
c"
754.33
JAMES MAYNARD vs. SAMUEL

McKINN.
Step-father's liability for maintenanc. qf
step-son during the life of latter'sfather.
Assumpsit.
WALTER B. FREED and ROET. P. STEWART for plaintiff.
The defendant had notice that Maynard
was supporting his child and acquiesced in
Maynard's conduct. This creates an implied contract for which defendant is liale. 6 Ad. & El. 718; Mortimer v. White,
6 M. & W. 482; Thayer v. White, 12 Metc.
343; Story on Cont. 139, Sec. 82 (a); Miller's
Appeal, 100 Pa. 570. A step-fatheris under
no obligation to support his step-children.
Brookfield v. Warren, 128 Mass. 287; Worcester v. Marchant, 14 Pick 512; Williams
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v. Hutchinson, 3 N. Y. 312. A father is
liable for the support of an infant child
not able to earn its own living. Act June
13, 1q36, P. L. 539, Sec. 28; Wertz v. Blair
Co., 66 Pa. 11.
B. FRANx FE@NTON and CHAS. G. MOYER for the defendant.
If the step-father receives his step-children into his home and supports and educates them, he stands in loco parentiq and
can not maintain an action for such support. They mutually assume the relation
of parent and child. Horton's Appeal, 94
Pa. 62; Mulhern v. McDavitt, 16 Gray
404; Sharp v. Cropsey, 11 Barb. (N. Y.)
224. The son was taken surreptitiously by
the mother after divorce without a decree
as to the custody of the child. 37 L. R A.
589. The father was willing to support his
child but the step-father assumed the obli
gation. Chilcott v. Trimble, 13 Barb. (N.
Y.) 502; Duffey v. Duffey, 8 Wright 399.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

McKinn and wife were divorced. A son,
nine years of age, continued to live with
the father for two years thereafter, when,
his mother meeting him, induced him to
come and live with her. She having been
married to Maynard, with whom she was
living, the son went with her. When
shortly afterwards, McKinn was informed
that his son had gone to his mother's, he
sent the boy's trunk and clothing to Maynard's house. Here the son continued to
live for the future. At the expiration of
three years, Maynard brought this action
against McKinn for the support of the
boy for three years.
There can be no doubt that the father is
bound to support his minod children
Should he neglect to do so, he would be
liable to such persons as sold food, clothing
and other necessaries to him. Along with
this duty of support, exists the right of control and companionship. It is possiblefor
other persons to establish the relation of
quasi-parent to the child, and to assume
the burden of supporting it, so that, after
giving it food, clothing and shelter, they
would have no recourse for compensation
to the father. Thus, if an uncle, also
guardian of a child, takes it to his house,
and treats it as his child, he can not charge
hek estate with the cost of her support.
Norton's Appeal, 94 Pa 62. A grandfather, who, on the death of the child's
mother, takes it to his home, and there
supports it, cannot be reimbursed from the
estate of its father. Duffey v. Duffey, 44

Pa. 399 A step-father who has taken his
wife's child into his house and there supported it, cannot be repaid by the guardian of the child. Douglas's Appeal, 82
Pa. 169; Ruckman's Appeal, 61 Pa. 251.
Several of these cases intimate that had
there been a contract between the quasiparent and the father, or the guardian
of the child, for compensation to the
former, there might have been a recovery
for such compensation.
The father is entitled to the custody of
the child, and the duty of support accompanies that custody. If the mother,
after being divorced'from him, retains the
child, there arises, as respects the father, a
duty on her to maintain it. She cannot sup
port an action against him for reimbursement. Titler v. Titler, 33 Pa. 50. Said
Lowrie C. J., in that case, "The father is
willing to take the child and support it
himself. If she prefers to keep it, she can
claim nothing from him as a right; and
we cannot enforce the duty of generosity.
When a man abandons his child and casts
it upon the public, he becomes liable for its
support. But it is entirely impossible to
treat the child as thus east on the public,
when the fact simply is, that the mother
has deserted the father, and carried away
the child and continues to supportit. This
is merely leaving it with her, until she
chooses to restore it, and while she keeps
it on such ground, she has no claim for
compensation."
McKinn's wife has after divorce, married Maynard. She has enticed the boy
from McKinn, and, with the consent of
her present husband, has kept him in his
house. He has been supplied by Maynard
with food, clothing and necessaries. If
Maynard was unwilling thus to support
the child, he had a means of avoiding the
burden. He might have returned him to
McKinn. He might have notified McKinn that the boy was at his disposal,
and that if not brought away, compensation for his support would be expected.
He might have insisted on a promise from
McKinn to reimburse him for any expenses. He did none of these things
Yielding to the wishes of his wife, he allowed the child to remain in his house, as
a member of his family. He has no right
after the acquiescence by the boy's father,
in the loss of his society and the control of
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his education, to surprise him with a demand for compensation. There was no
express contract by the father to compensate the step-father. Nor are there any
facts from which an implied contract can
be constructed. Titler v. Titler, 33 Pa. 50;
Duffey v. Duffey, 44 Pa. 399. In Toss v.
Hartwell, 168 Mass. 66, a case strikingly
like the one at bar, the court after saying,
"If there is a legal obligation [to support
the child] it rests upon the ground that he
[the father] is entitled to the custody, the
society, and the services of the child. He
must also have the right to determine
where his child shall live. If a son chooses

to leave voluntarily his father's house, and
live elsewhere, his father is not responsible
for his support. Angel v. McLellan, 16
Mass. 28. So, if a child is induced by another to leave his father, without any necessity for so doing, the person thus influencing him to leave would, in case he
furnishes supplies, have no cause of action
against the father. Dodge v. Adams, 19
Pick 429, 432," concludes, "If the plaintiff
chose to receive him, he had no right,
without communicating with the. defendant, to look to the father for the boy's support."
Judgment of non-suit.

